Members of the European Parliament from Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland argue for tougher measures against Russia’s “shadow fleet” in the Baltic Sea.
Over 15 months, on four separate occasions, ships travelling to or from Russia caused significant damage to several underwater energy and data links in the Baltic Sea by dragging their heavy anchors over the cables and pipelines.
Only the most gullible could call these mere “accidents”, regardless of the claims. The ships’ anchors and chains weigh over ten tonnes and do not sink without warning. The Chinese-owned ships New New Polar Bear, Yi Peng 3, Eagle S and Vezhen all exhibited suspicious movements when they reached the areas around the cables.
Finnish authorities have found no conclusive evidence of deliberate sabotage, but they acknowledge that Russian involvement cannot be entirely ruled out. Whether or not the damage was deliberate is secondary – any damage to critical underwater infrastructure must be treated as a serious attack on our collective security.
Russian intelligence was careful not to leave behind incriminating evidence that could be used in court. However, the absence of legal proof does not automatically mean the damage was accidental. In hybrid operations, denial is always a key strategy.
The issue is not confined to the Baltic Sea; it is a global problem. Russia – and possibly other hostile actors – have been mapping critical infrastructure worldwide, with similar occurrences in the English Channel, the Atlantic along transatlantic communication cables and many other areas.
The submarine cable infrastructure in the Baltic Sea plays a vital role in both energy and data transmission, but it is only one part of a vast network. Dense submarine energy and telecommunications networks also span the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the coasts of Spain and Portugal, the English Channel, and the Canary Islands. These links are essential for energy security and global telecommunications.
Submarine cables carry the majority of international data traffic, worth trillions of euros. However, increasing geopolitical tensions and the rise of cyber threats have raised concerns about the security of this vital infrastructure. Preventing the sabotage of submarine cables in the Baltic Sea requires a multifaceted approach, combining technological, strategic and cooperative measures.
In addition to NATO’s ongoing surveillance operations, the EU must take decisive action. The first priority is tackling one of the root causes: the sanctions-evading fleet. Regardless of the flag they fly, these vessels are not independent operators – they are Russian proxies.
The EU must use its economic and diplomatic power to stop this de facto Russian fleet from operating and bypassing sanctions. The owners and operators of these ships must be penalised. Furthermore, the consequences for damaging critical underwater infrastructure must be significantly increased to serve as an effective deterrent. These ships must also be held accountable for maritime safety violations, as their poor condition and outdated equipment pose a serious environmental risk.
Secondly, monitoring of the ships is essential. If we can demand compulsory onboard cameras (CCTV) for fishing vessels, then the same standard should apply to the captain’s deck of commercial freight ships. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) already mandates Automatic Identification Systems (AIS); it should now enforce mandatory CCTV for ships operating near critical infrastructure. Additionally, turning off AIS – an increasingly common practice among suspect vessels – must carry far harsher penalties.
Swift and decisive action from member states, NATO and the EU is key to preventing further sabotage or these so-called “accidents”. The seizure of the Eagle S by the Finnish authorities is an excellent example and should be followed. The threshold for intervention to protect our critical underwater infrastructure must be as low as possible.
Finally, public awareness plays a vital role. We must recognise that we are being targeted and attacked by hostile forces. Russia, its allies, and its proxies must face real consequences, not just condemnation.
Riho Terras MEP, EPP Group/Estonia, Vice-Chair of the Security and Defence Committee
Pekka Toveri MEP, EPP Group/Finland, Member of the Security and Defence Committee
Rasa Juknevičienė MEP, EPP Group/Lithuania, Member, Mice-coordinator of the Security and Defence Committee
